Bayesian implementation concerns decision making problems when agents have incomplete information. This paper proposes that the traditional sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum Bayesian mechanism. In addition, by using an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, this amendment holds in the macro world. More importantly, we find that the revelation principle is not always right by using the quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms.
Introduction
Mechanism design is an important branch of economics. Compared with game theory, it concerns a reverse question: given some desirable outcomes, can we design a game that produces them? Nash implementation and Bayesian implementation are two key topics of the mechanism design theory. The former assumes complete information among the agents, whereas the latter concerns incomplete information. Maskin [1] provided an almost complete characterization of social choice rules that are Nash implementable when the number of agents is at least three. Postlewaite and Schmeidler [2] , Palfrey and Srivastava [3] , and Jackson [4] together constructed a framework for Bayesian implementation.
In 2011, Wu [5] claimed that the sufficient conditions for Nash implementation shall be amended by virtue of a quantum mechanism. Furthermore, this amendment holds in the macro world by virtue of an algorithmic mechanism [6] . Given these accomplishments in the field of Nash implementation, this paper aims to investigate what will happen if the quantum mechanism is applied to Bayesian implementation.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls preliminaries of Bayesian implementation given by Serrano [7] . In Section 3, a novel condition, multi-Bayesian monotonicity, is defined. Section 4 and 5 are the main parts of this paper, in which we will propose quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms respectively, and claim that the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium is not always right. Section 6 draws the conclusions.
Preliminaries
Let N = {1, · · · , n} be a finite set of agents with n ≥ 2, A = {a 1 , · · · , a k } be a finite set of social outcomes. Let T i be the finite set of agent i's types, and the private information possessed by agent i is denoted as t i ∈ T i . We refer to a profile of types t = (t 1 , · · · , t n ) as a state. Consider environments in which the state t = (t 1 , · · · , t n ) is not common knowledge among the n agents. We denote by T the set of states compatible with an environment, i.e., a set of states that is common knowledge among the agents. Let T = i∈N T i . Each agent i ∈ N knows his type t i ∈ T i , but not necessarily the types of the others. We will use the notation t −i to denote (t j ) j i . Similarly,
Each agent has a prior belief, probability distribution, q i defined on T . We make an assumption of nonredundant types: for every i ∈ N and t i ∈ T i , there exists t −i ∈ T −i such that q i (t) > 0. For each i ∈ N and t i ∈ T i , the conditional probability of t −i ∈ T −i , given t i , is the posterior belief of type t i and it is denoted q i (t −i |t i ). Given agent i's state t i and utility function u i (·, t) : ∆ × T → R, the conditional expected utility of agent i of type t i corresponding to a social choice function (SCF) f : T → ∆ is defined as:
An environment is economic if, as part of the social outcomes, there exists a private good (e.g., money) over which all agents have a strictly positive preference. For simplicity, we shall consider only single-valued rules, i.e., an SCF f is a mapping f : T → A. Let F denote the set of SCFs. Two SCFs f and h are equivalent
Consider a mechanism Γ = ((M i ) i∈N , g) imposed on an incomplete information environment E, g : M → F . A Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Γ is a profile of strategies
Denote by B(Γ) the set of Bayesian equilibria of the mechanism Γ. Let g(B(Γ)) be the corresponding set of equilibrium outcomes. An SCF f is Bayesian implementable if there exists a mechanism Γ = ((M i ) i∈N , g) such that g(B(Γ)) ≈ f . An SCF f is incentive compatible if truth-telling is a Bayesian equilibrium of the direct mechanism associated with f , i.e., if for every i ∈ N and for every t i ∈ T i ,
The revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium (P884, [8] ): Suppose that there exists a mechanism that implements an SCF f in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, then f is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Consider a strategy in a direct mechanism for agent i, i.e., a mapping
i∈N is a collection of such mappings where at least one differs from the identity mapping. Given an SCF f and a deception α,
Bayesian monotonic if for any deception α, whenever f • α f , there exist i ∈ N, t i ∈ T i , and an SCF y such that
In economic environments, the sufficient and necessary conditions for full Bayesian implementation are incentive compatibility and Bayesian monotonicity. To facilitate the following discussion, here we cite the Bayesian mechanism (page 404, line 4, [7] ) as follows: Consider a mechanism Γ = ((M i ) i∈N , g), where M i = T i × F × Z + , and Z + is the set of nonnegative integers. Each agent is asked to report his type t i , an SCF f i and a nonnegative integer z i , i.e., m i = (t i , f i , z i ). The outcome function g is as follows:
In all other cases, the total endowment of the economy is awarded to the agent of smallest index among those who announce the largest integer. 
, there exist t i ∈ T i and an SCF y i ∈ F that satisfy:
Without loss of generality, let these l agents be the last l agents among n agents.
In 1993, Matsushima [9] claimed that Bayesian monotonicity is a very weak condition when utility functions are quasi-linear and lotteries are available. Consider an SCF f that satisfies Bayesian monononicity, if there is a deception α such that its corresponding agent i has another symmetric agent j (i.e., i j, u i = u j , T i = T j , the prior belief and posterior belief hold by them are the same), then f is multiBayesian monotonic.
Proposition 1:
In economic environments, consider an SCF f that is incentive compatible and Bayesian monotonic, if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then f • α is not Bayesian implementable by using the traditional Bayesian mechanism, where α is specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity. Proof: According to Serrano's proof (page 404, line 33, [7] ), all equilibrium strategies fall under rule (i), i.e., f is unanimously announced and all agents announce the integer 0. Consider the deception α specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity. At first sight, if every agent i ∈ N submits (α i (t i ), f, 0), then f • α may be generated as the equilibrium outcome by rule (i). However, For each agent i ∈ N α , he has incentives to unilaterally deviate from (
• α by rule (ii.a). This is a profitable deviation for each agent i ∈ N α . Therefore, f • α is not Bayesian implementable. Note: Since all agents are self-interested and act non-cooperatively, every agent i ∈ N α will submit (α i (t i ), y i , 0). Actually, rule (iii) instead of rule (ii.a) will be triggered. The final outcome will be uncertain according to the integer game specified in rule (iii).
A quantum Bayesian mechanism
Following Ref. [5] , here we will propose a quantum Bayesian mechanism to modify the sufficient conditions for Bayesian implementation. According to Eq (4) in Ref.
[10], two-parameter quantum strategies are drawn from the set:
Without loss of generality, we assume that: 1) Each agent i has a quantum coin i (qubit) and a classical card i. The basis vectors
T of a quantum coin denote head up and tail up respectively. 2) Each agent i independently performs a local unitary operation on his/her own quantum coin. The set of agent i's operation isΩ i =Ω. A strategic operation chosen by agent i is denoted asω
3) The two sides of a card are denoted as Side 0 and Side 1. The message written on the Side 0 (or Side 1) of card i is denoted as card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1)). A typical card written by agent i is described as
There is a device that can measure the state of n coins and send messages to the designer.
A quantum Bayesian mechanism Γ Q B = ((Σ i ) i∈N ,ĝ) describes a strategy setΣ i = {σ i : T i →Ω i × C i } for each agent i and an outcome functionĝ :
The setup of the quantum Bayesian mechanism Γ Q B = ((Σ i ) i∈N ,ĝ) is depicted in Fig.  1 . The working steps of Γ Q B are given as follows:
Step 1: Nature selects a state t ∈ T and assigns t to the agents. Each agent i knows t i and q i (t −i |t i ). The state of each quantum coin is set as |C . The initial state of the n quantum coins is |ψ 0 = |C · · · CC n .
Step 2: If f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then go to Step 4.
Step 3: Each agent i sets c i = ((t i , f i , z i ), (t i , f i , z i ) ),ω i =Î. Go to Step 7.
Step 4: Each agent i sets c i = ((α i (t i ), f, 0), (t i , f i , z i )) (where α is specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity). Let n quantum coins be entangled bŷ J. |ψ 1 =Ĵ|ψ 0 .
Step Step 6: Let n quantum coins be disentangled byĴ
Step 7: The device measures the state of n quantum coins and sends card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1)) as m i to the designer if the state of quantum coin i is |C (or |D ).
Step 8: The designer receives the overall message m = (m 1 , · · · , m n ) and let the final outcomeĝ(σ) = g(m) using rules (i)-(iii) specified in the traditional Bayesian mechanism. END.
Given n ≥ 3 agents, consider the payoff to the nth agent, we denote by $ C···CC the expected payoff when all agents chooseÎ (the corresponding collapsed state is |C · · · CC n ), and denote by $ C···CD the expected payoff when the nth agent chooseŝ Consider the payoff to the nth agent, $ C···CC > $ D···DD , i.e., he/she prefers the expected payoff of a certain outcome (generated by rule (i)) to the expected payoff of an uncertain outcome (generated by rule (iii)). 2) λ 
Proposition 2:
In economic environments, consider an SCF f that is incentive compatible and Bayesian monotonic, if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic and condition λ B is satisfied, then f is not Bayesian implementable by using the quantum Bayesian mechanism, and the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not hold. Proof: Since f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, then there exist a deception α, f • α f , and 2 ≤ l ≤ n agents that satisfy Eq (**), i.e., for each agent i ∈ N α , there exist t i ∈ T i and an SCF y i ∈ F such that:
Hence, the quantum Bayesian mechanism will enter Step 4. Each agent i ∈ N sets c i = ((α i (t i ), f, 0), (t i , f i , z i ) ). Let c = (c 1 , · · · , c n ). Since condition λ B is satisfied, then similar to the proof of Proposition 2 in Ref. [5] , if the n agents choosê
Step 7, the corresponding collapsed state of n quantum coins is |C · · · CC n . Hence, for each agent
Therefore, f is not Bayesian implementable and f • α is implemented by Γ Q B in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Note that f • α is not incentive compatible (since f is incentive compatible), the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not hold.
An algorithmic Bayesian mechanism
Following Ref. [6] , in this section we will propose an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism to help agents benefit from the quantum Bayesian mechanism in the macro world. In the beginning, we cite matrix representations of quantum states from Ref. [6] .
Matrix representations of quantum states
In quantum mechanics, a quantum state can be described as a vector. For a twolevel system, there are two basis vectors: (1, 0) T and (0, 1) T . In the beginning, we define:
For γ = π/2,
An algorithm that simulates the quantum operations and measurements
Similar to Ref. [6] , in the following we will propose an algorithm that simulates the quantum operations and measurements in Steps 4-7 of the quantum Bayesian mechanism given in Section 4. The inputs and outputs are adjusted to the case of Bayesian implementation. The factor γ is also set as its maximum π/2. For n agents, the inputs and outputs of the algorithm are illustrated in Fig. 2 . The Matlab program is given in Fig. 3 , which is cited from Ref. [6] .
the information written on the two sides of agent i's card, where
Outputs: m i , i = 1, · · · , n: the agent i's message that is sent to the designer, m i ∈ T i × F × Z + .
Procedures of the algorithm:
Step 1: Reading parameters θ i and φ i from each agent i ∈ N (See Fig. 3(a) ).
Step 2 ... Fig. 2 . The inputs and outputs of the algorithm.
3(b)).
Step 3: Computing the vector representation of
Step 4: Computing the vector representation of |ψ 3 =Ĵ + π/2 |ψ 2 .
Step 5: Computing the probability distribution ψ 3 |ψ 3 (See Fig. 3(c) ).
Step 6: Randomly choosing a "collapsed" state from the set of all 2 n possible states {|C · · · CC n , · · · , |D · · · DD n } according to the probability distribution ψ 3 |ψ 3 .
Step 7: For each i ∈ N, the algorithm sends card(i, 0) (or card(i, 1)) as a message m i to the designer if the i-th basis vector of the "collapsed" state is |C (or |D ) (See Fig. 3(d) ).
An algorithmic version of the quantum Bayesian mechanism
In the quantum Bayesian mechanism Γ Q B = ((Σ i ) i∈N ,ĝ), the key parts are quantum operations and measurements, which are restricted by current experimental technologies. In Section 5.2, these parts are replaced by an algorithm which can be easily run in a computer. Consequently, the quantum Bayesian mechanism Γ Q B = ((Σ i ) i∈N ,ĝ) shall be updated to an algorithmic Bayesian mechanism Γ Q B = (( Σ i ) i∈N , g), which describes a strategy set
Since the factor γ is set as its maximum π/2 in the algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, the condition λ Step 1: Given an SCF f , if f is multi-Bayesian monotonic, go to Step 3.
Step 2: Each agent i sends (t i , f i , z i ) as the message m i to the designer. Go to Step 5.
Step 3: Each agent i sets card(i, 0) = (α i (t i ), f, 0) and card(i, 1) = (t i , f i , z i ) (where α is specified in the definition of multi-Bayesian monotonicity), then submits θ i , φ i , card(i, 0) and card(i, 1) to the algorithm.
Step 4: The algorithm runs in a computer and outputs messages m 1 , · · · , m n to the designer.
Step 5: The designer receives the overall message m = (m 1 , · · · , m n ) and let the final outcome be g(m) using rules (i)-(iii) of the traditional Bayesian mechanism. END.
New results for Bayesian implementation and revelation principle
Proposition 3: In economic environments, given an SCF f that is incentive compatible and Bayesian monotonic: 1) If f is multi-Bayesian monotonic and condition λ Bπ/2 is satisfied, then f is not Bayesian implementable by using the algorithmic Bayesian mechanism, and the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not hold. is satisfied, then similar to the proof of Proposition 1 in Ref. [6] , if the n agents choose
). In Step 6 of the algorithm, the corresponding "collapsed" state is |C · · · CC n . Hence, in Step 7 of the algorithm,
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Note that f • α is not incentive compatible (since f is incentive compatible), the revelation principle for Bayesian Nash equilibrium does not hold. 2) If f is not multi-Bayesian monotonic, then Γ Q B is reduced to the traditional Bayesian mechanism. Since the SCF f is incentive compatible and Bayesian monotonic, then it is Bayesian implementable.
Conclusions
This paper follows the series of papers on quantum mechanism [5, 6] , and generalizes the quantum and algorithmic mechanisms in Refs. [5, 6] to Bayesian implementation. It can be seen that for n agents, the time complexity of quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms are O(n) and O(2 n ) respectively. Although current experimental technologies restrict the quantum Bayesian mechanism to be commercially available, for small-scale cases (e.g., less than 20 agents [6] ), the algorithmic Bayesian mechanism can help agents benefit from quantum Bayesian mechanism just in the macro world. More importantly, the revelation principle may not hold by using the quantum and algorithmic Bayesian mechanisms. Since the revelation principle has been widely applied to many fields such as auction, contract, the theory of incentives and so on, there are many works to do in the future to generalize the quantum and algorithmic mechanisms. 
